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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
would grant a preference over other judgment creditors who held
income executions in compliance with CPLR 5231. In rejecting
this defense, the Supreme Court, Bronx County, held that priority
of income executions does not preclude an application by any judg-
ment creditor for an installment order. The court reasoned that
CPLR 5226 and CPLR 5231 are separate and distinct devices and
that priority within each device is on a "first come-first serve
basis."
The holding allows a judgment creditor with a judgment
against a debtor who already has been served with an income
execution to receive, perhaps, some money immediately. 58  If an
earlier judgment creditor does not avail himself of 5226 this in no
way affects a later judgment creditor from seeking the benefits of
its provisions.
CPLR 5235: Court scrutinizes judicial sale.
A judgment creditor's lien and priority attach to any interest
the judgment debtor may have in real property which is subject
to the satisfaction of a money judgment.60  CPLR 5203 provides
that the rights of a judgment creditor in the real property of the
judgment debtor accrue either upon docketing or, after the expira-
tion of ten years from the filing of the judgment roll, upon the
filing of a notice of levy.
The lien acquired upon docketing is effective for a period of
ten years from the date the judgment roll is filed. The judgment,
however, stands as a debt for a period of twenty years and, is not
terminated by the expiration of the judgment lien.6' In recognition
of this anomaly CPLR 5235 permits the judgment creditor to levy
on real property upon the passage of ten years after the filing of
the judgment roll. This levy provides a temporary lien which is
effective from the time notice of levy is filed until the execution
is returned.
The provisions of the CPA allowing the debtor to redeem any
realty sold under an execution were an attempt to bring about
fairer judicial sales by the realization of a price closer to the full
58 CPLR 5226 directs "the court to take into consideration the reason-
able requirements of the judgment debtor . . . any payments required
to be made by him or deducted from the money he would otherwise receive
in satisfaction of other judgments and wage assignments. . ....
59See Caruso v. Schilingo, 23 App. Div. 2d 627, 257 N.Y.S.2d 719 (4th
Dep't 1965) (upholding the concept, although the case was improper for
the relief sought).
606 WEiNsTmx, KoRN & MILL.ER, Nav YoRx CiviL PRAcricE 52f03.02
(1968); Rogers v. Banner, 45 N.Y. 379 (1871); Benadan v. Antonio, 10
App. Div. 2d 40, 197 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1st Dep't 1960).
61CPLR 211 (b). See also 7B McKIxNEY's CPLR 5235, commentary
187 (1963).
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value of the property. 2 Paradoxically, they had precisely the oppo-
site effect. CPLR 5236 eliminates the equity of redemption thereby
preventing both the debtor and his creditors from reaching the
property subsequent to sale. It is hoped that this new procedure
will more effectively achieve the goals of the former redemption
power. 3 Since the CPLR abandons the debtor's equity of redemp-
tion, the courts have felt constrained to scrutinize judicial sales,
especially when there is a danger of inequity. The result of such
scrutiny has been a rigid insistence upon adherence to the statutory
requirements.
A recent example of a court's refusal to sanction even the
most technical deviation from the statutory norm is Community
Capital Corp. v. Lee.64  Here the judgment creditor delivered an
execution to the sheriff five days prior to the expiration of the
judgment lien. On the same date a notice of levy was filed in the
County Clerk's office. Pursuant to the execution, a sheriff's sale
was held eight weeks later and was bid in by the plaintiff-pur-
chaser. In holding the sale invalid the court noted a deviation
from the statutory norm. As CPLR 5236 requires publication of
at least eight weeks notice of sale, no sale could be effected until
after the judgment lien had expired. In situations such as this,
the judgment creditor is afforded the protection of CPLR 5203(b)
which allows, upon motion, an extension of the judgment lien
where such is "necessary to complete advertisement and sale of real
property in accordance with section 5236."
Strictly construing section 5235, the court observed that the
section permits filing of a notice of levy only after the expiration
of the judgment lien and hence does not authorize the filing of
one before the lien expire's, as was done in the instant case. Thus,
inasmuch as the procedure followed by the judgment creditor was
unauthorized, the sale was held to be invalid.
The full impact of the Community Capital case is not
readily discernible. It is to be noted that a court has the inherent
power to set aside an execution sale when, as in the present case,
it yields a grossly inadequate price.65 The court's reliance, how-
ever, upon failure to conform to the technical requirements of
section 5235 would seem to indicate a similar result, regardless of
the adequacy of price. The judgment creditor in situations where
6
2 See 6 WEINSm.IN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE
15236.02 (1968). See also Note, Execution Priorities Between Real Estate
and Personal Property in Illinois, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 548, 550-51 (1952).
636 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NENv YORK CIVIL PRACTICE ff5236.P2(1968).
6458 Misc. 2d 34, 294 N.Y.S.2d 336 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1968).
05 See generally Fisher v. Hersey, 78 N.Y. 387 (1879) ; Empire State
Development Co. v. Lambert, 15 App. Div. 2d 511, 222 N.Y.S.2d 681 (2d
Dep't 1961), mod. nero., 15 App. Div. 2d 936, 227 N.Y.S.2d 891 (2d Dep't
1962), aff'd inem., 11 N.Y.2d 913, 183 N.E.2d 75, 228 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1962).
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execution is issued too close to the termination of the judgment
lien has recourse, therefore, only to the express statutory alterna-
tives :66 he may issue execution upon the judgment lien allowing
at least eight weeks for the termination thereof; pursuant to section
5203(b) he may move for an extension of the lien for the time
necessary to complete advertisement and sale in accordance with
section 5236; or he may file notice of levy after the excpiration of
the judgment lien.
ARTICLE 75 - ARBITRATION
CPLR 7501: Court may order consolidation of arbitrations.
Under the CPA, arbitration of a controversy was itself a
special proceeding.6 7  Consolidation could be directed pursuant to
CPA 96 which generally empowered the courts to consolidate spe-
cial proceedings. As a result of CPLR 7502, which eliminated the
concept that arbitration itself is a special proceeding, a question
has arisen as to whether courts can order consolidation of arbitra-
tions with a common party upon the application of such party.
Since there is no "action" pending, may the court order con-
solidation?
In Matter of Chariot Textiles Corp.,"" the appellate division,
first department, held that a court could not order consolidation.
It adopted the view that no motion to consolidate could be made
because there would be no action pending at the time.6 9
The dissent took the position that the courts had not been
divested of the power to order consolidation by virtue of 7502.
In its view, Chariot's application to the court' for consolidation
"transmuted each of the arbitrations into a special proceeding since
it was 'used to bring before a court the first application arising out
of an arbitrable controversy. . . .' " ' Support for this view was
found in CPLR 7501, which provides that "[a] written agreement
66 Apparently the levy lien under CPA 512 could be resorted to while
the judgment lien was still in effect. See 7B McKiNNEY's CPLR 5235,
legislative studies and reports 188 (1963). As at common law, judgments
were not liens against property, conformity to the statutory requisites is
ordinarily essential to the effectuation of a valid lien. For a full discussion
see 9 CARDY-WArr 2I> CYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK PRaC'ICE §63:114
(1966).
67 See CPA § 1459.
6821 App. Div. 2d 762, 250 N.Y.S.2d 493 (1st Dep't 1964).
69See also 8 WEINsTE N, KoRx & MnLER, NEw YORK CIVIL PRAMCICE
750204-.05 (1968), espousing the view that under CPLR 7502 the statu-
tory basis has been removed and therefore the courts must either find a
new rationale or abandon the practice of consolidating arbitrations.
7021 App. Div. 2d at 763, 250 N.Y.S,2d at 49$ (dissenting opinion)
(citing CPLR 7502(a)),
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